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INTRODUCTION
T HE JANUARY 2013 FIRES aboard two Boeing 787 Dream-liner airplanes' drew public attention to a little-known issue
that the Department of Transportation (DOT) had been at-
tempting to regulate for several years: the spontaneous ignition
of lithium batteries. 2 A record of battery fires on airplanes and
during the transit process for the past two decades motivated
the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA) to take action, only to find that more comprehensive
shipping regulations on lithium batteries would be halted by in-
dustry groups' successful lobbying efforts.3 Proposed regulations
that would have reduced exemptions for lithium batteries under
hazardous material shipping guidelines were defeated by a small
addition to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Moderni-
zation and Reform Act of 2012, which prohibits the regulation
of lithium battery shipments at any stricter level than the inter-
national standards.'
This article argues that the prohibition against stricter regula-
tion of aerial shipment of lithium batteries should be repealed.
Part I provides a background on lithium batteries and the pro-
gression of restrictions upon their shipment in aviation. Part II
describes the concerns regarding lithium battery fires and the
PHMSA's regulation in this area. Part III argues in favor of re-
pealing Section 828 of the Act (thereby allowing the DOT to
regulate most lithium batteries as Class 9 hazardous materials)
and implementing innovative packing standards that reduce the
spread of fire from lithium batteries.
I Boeing 787 Dreamliner- A Timeline of Problems, TELEGRAPH (July 28, 2013, 3:36
PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/travelnews/10207415/Boeing-787-
Dreamliner-a-timeline-of-problems.html.
2 See, e.g., FAA, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., SAFO 10017, SAFETY ALERT FOR OPERA-
TORS (2010), available at http://www.faa.gov/other visit/aviation-industry/air-
lineoperators/airline-safety/safo/all_safos/media/2010/SAFO10017.pdf
(alerting air carriers to risks in transporting lithium batteries).
3 See PRBA Urges PHMSA to Align U.S. Air Transport Rules for Lithium Batteries with
Stricter International Standards, RECHARGEABLE BATTERY ASS'N (Mar. 26, 2013),
http://www.prba.org/general/prba-urges-phmsa-to-align-u-s-air-transport-rules-
for-lithium-batteries-with-stricter-international-standards-669.
4 See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 828,





In an increasingly technological world, portable electronics
have become an essential element of modern life. People work
remotely on their laptops, stay in contact with mobile phones,
and depend on a myriad of other battery-powered devices in
daily activities. As the use of electronics has grown, so too has
the popularity of lithium batteries due to their light weight, high
energy density, and long battery life.5
Lithium batteries are separated into two categories: lithium
metal and lithium ion.6 Non-rechargeable lithium metal batter-
ies are generally used to power small electronics like watches
and calculators.' Rechargeable lithium ion batteries are found
in consumer electronics such as mobile phones, laptops, and
portable music players.' The integration of lithium batteries
into consumer electronics began in the 1990s; worldwide pro-
duction has since increased to several billion units of batteries
per year.' Lithium batteries will become increasingly prevalent
in the future as the use and number of portable electronics
grow. A study of worldwide lithium reserves found that there is a
sufficient global supply of lithium to meet demand for the next
century,o so lithium-powered electronics are likely here to stay
for the foreseeable future.
The vast majority of lithium battery manufacturing takes place
in East Asia, with domestic manufacturers only supporting niche
markets in medical or military applications." Large battery ship-
ments must be transported from their Asian manufacturers to
global markets, though the transport of hazardous lithium is not
without risk.
5 See Paul W. Gruber et al., Global Lithium Availability: A Constraint for Electric
Vehicles?, 15 J. INDUS. ECOLOGY 760, 761 (2011).





9 Bruno Scrosati, History of Lithium Batteries, 15 J. SOLID ST. ELECTROCHEMISTRY
1623, 1627-29 (2011).
10 Gruber et al., supra note 5, at 760.
1 Ralph J. Brodd, Factors Affecting U.S. Production Decisions: Why Are There No
Volume Lithium-Ion Battery Manufacturers in the United States? 9 (ATP Working Paper
Series, Working Paper 05-01, 2005), available at http://www.atp.nist.gov/eao/
wp05-01/wp05-0l.pdf.
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B. TRANSPORTATION REGULATIONS
Since lithium batteries contain a large quantity of energy in a
small package, they have the ability to generate a great deal of
heat.12 A fire may break out if the batteries short circuit, such as
when a metal object comes into contact with unprotected bat-
tery terminals." Additionally, the chemical material inside the
batteries is easily ignited and highly flammable; the batteries are
at an increased fire risk when damaged or improperly re-
paired." Studies have found that lithium metal batteries' low
self-ignition temperature and high reactivity pose a significant
hazard and could result in loss of aircraft if inflamed during
flight." This risk of flammability means that many lithium bat-
teries have additional safety and shipping requirements as haz-
ardous materials."
Lithium batteries, like other hazardous materials, appear in-
nocuous partly because of the frequency and commonality of
their usage. In fact, accidents and fatalities attributed to com-
monplace regulated hazardous materials far outnumber those
caused by more recognized dangerous substances regulated
under the Resource and Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA)
and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act (CERCLA) .17 Though RCRA- and CER-
CLA-regulated substances are subject to many safety restrictions,
these materials represent less than 3% of hazardous material
shipments each year."' The remaining 97% of regulated materi-
als present risks that match or exceed the risks presented by
commonly known dangerous substances like radioactive mate-
rial or hazardous waste, yet their shipment has become rou-
12 CELINA MIKOLAJCZAK ET AL., LITHIUM-ION BATTERIES HAZARD AND USE ASSESS-
MENT 25 (James A. Milke ed., 2011), available at http://link.springer.com/book/
10. 1007/978-1-4614-3486-3/page/ 1.
3 Id. at 60.
14 Id. at 43, 46.
15 STEVEN M. SUMMER, FAA, DOT/FAA/AR-09/55, FLAMMABILITY ASSESSMENT
OF LITHIUM-ION AND LITHIUM-ION POLYMER BATTERY CELLS DESIGNED FOR AIR-
CRAFr POWER USAGE 21-22 (2010), available at http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/pdf/09-
55.pdf.
16 MIKOLAJCZAK ET AL., supra note 12, at 31.
17 See Michael B. Gerrard, Demons and Angels in Hazardous Waste Regulation: Are
Justice, Efficiency, and Democracy Reconcilable?, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 706, 720-21 (1998)
(book review).
18 OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., OTA-SET-304, TRANSPORTATION
OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 6, 41 (1986).
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tine. 9 The DOT-the department containing the FAA and the
PHMSA-regulates the shipment of dangerous items, including
lithium batteries, through shipping categories that require spe-
cific labeling and restrictions for bulk international shipments. 20
Lithium battery transportation is regulated under the DOT's
Hazardous Materials Regulations 21 and by the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).22
Due to the risk involved in transporting lithium batteries, all
shipping carriers require those sending parcels to take special
precautions when mailing batteries. For example, there are lim-
its on the size and quantity of lithium batteries that may be
mailed in a single shipment.23 Failure to follow the guidelines
for shipping lithium batteries or declare their presence in a
package can result in six-figure penalties to the party that paid
to ship the materials. 24 The safety regulations are particularly
important when batteries are shipped via airmail, where the
ramifications of an accident have the potential to be far greater
because of the disastrous consequence of plane crashes. The dif-
ficulty of monitoring self-declared shipments for hazardous
materials poses an additional risk, especially when the public is
unaware of the risks and regulations involved in transporting
lithium batteries.
The planes, cargo, and lives lost in crashes25 instigated by lith-
ium battery fires have led to nine-figure financial losses. While
19 Id.
20 PIPELINE & HAZARDOUS MATEIUALS SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP.,
DOT CHART 15: HAZARDOUS MATERIALS MARKINGS, LABELING AND PLACARDING
GUIDE (2013), available at http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/staticfiles/PHMSA/
DownloadableFiles/Files/Hazmat/Regulations/chart%2015.pdf.
21 49 C.F.R. §§ 171-173 (2012).
22 See generally Int'l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Technical Instructions for the Safe
Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air, ICAO Doc. 9284 AN/905 (2013).
23 See How to Safely Pack and Ship Batteries: Lithium Batteries, UPS (June 2012),
http://www.ups.com/media/news/en/shipping batteries.pdf; Shipping Danger-
ous Goods via FedEx Express, FEDEx, http://www.fedex.com/us/service-guide/our-
services/dangerous-goods-hazmat/index.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2013); Ship-
ping Goods with or Containing Lithium Batteries, DHL, http://www.dhl.com/en/ex-
press/shipping/shipping-advice/lithiumbatteries.html (last visited Nov. 10,
2013).
24 SeeJohn A. Hawkinson, MIT Fined $175K After FedEx Fire, MASS. INST. TECH.
(Sept. 9, 2011), http://tech.mit.edu/V131/N35/faapenalty.html.
25 See Alan Levin, Battery-Fire Crashes Seen Every Other Year as U.S. Rules Fought,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 21, 2011, 11:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-
12-21/battery-fire-crashes-seen-every-other-year.html.
26 Helen Yates, Aviation: The Tipping Point, REINSURANCE MAc. (June 24, 2011,
12:22 PM), http://reinsurancemagazine.com/articles/aviation-tipping-point.
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improving the safety of shipping hazardous materials like lith-
ium batteries may have a large initial expense, it could result in
a long-term reduction of liability and costs through the preven-
tion of catastrophic accidents. However, some fear that the in-
creased regulation of lithium battery shipments may lead to an
increase in undeclared shipments as formerly compliant ship-
pers seek to avoid additional costs. 2 7
Setting appropriate safety standards and regulations for the
shipment of lithium batteries is a crucial step in averting acci-
dents. Typical lithium battery shipping regulations depend on
the size, quantity, and type of battery being shipped." Current
battery regulations require batteries to meet standards promul-
gated in the United Nations (U.N.) Manual of Tests and Crite-
ria.2 9 The batteries also must be retested after refurbishment
and are prohibited from air transport if they are defective, dam-
aged, or shipped for recycling or disposal purposes without ap-
proval.o Furthermore, the batteries must have protections in
place to prevent an accidental short circuit."
1. Lithium Metal Battery Ban on Passenger Aircraft
As awareness of the risks involved with the transport of lith-
ium batteries increased, so too did the restrictions placed on
shipments. Lithium metal battery shipments were banned from
the cargo holds of U.S. passenger flights in 2004.32 The reason-
ing behind the interim final rule was that lithium metal battery
fires in the cargo compartment could overtake onboard safety
mechanisms and "have catastrophic consequences."3 3 The rule
was meant to apply only to bulk shipments, rather than personal
use, thereby exempting passenger carry-on and checked lug-
27 See Working Grp. of the Whole on Lithium Batteries, Report of the Meeting 4
(ICAO, Dangerous Goods Panel, Working Paper No. DGP-WG/LB/1-WP/15,
2012), available at http://www.icao.int/safety/DangerousGoods/Working%20
Group%20of%2o0the%20Whole% 20on%20Lithium%20Batteries201/
DGPWGLB.1.WP.015.en.pdf.
28 INT'L AIR TRANsp. Ass'N, supra note 6, at 9-10.
29 Id. at 9; see also U.N. ECON. COMM'N FOR EUR., U.N. MANUAL OF TESTS AND
CRITERIA, at 394, U.N. Doc. ST/SG/AC.10/11/Rev.5, U.N. Sales No. E.09.VIII.3
(2010), available at http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/danger/
publi/manual/Rev5/English/03en-part3.pdf.
30 See INT'L AIR TRANsP. Ass'N, supra note 6, at 5, 8.
31 See id. at 7.
32 Hazardous Materials; Prohibition on the Transportation of Primary Lithium
Batteries and Cells Aboard Passenger Aircraft, 69 Fed. Reg. 75,208 (Dec. 15,
2004) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 171-73, 175).
3 Id. at 75,211.
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gage.3 1 Individuals were permitted to carry both equipment con-
taining the batteries and spare batteries themselves. 5 Cargo
aircraft were immune from the limits, which only impacted pas-
senger aircraft. 6 One principle concern in the regulations was
that fire suppressants utilized in the cargo area of passenger air-
craft were unable to extinguish lithium metal battery fires.3 7
"Halon 1301 [is] the fire suppressant used in all passenger air-
craft cargo compartments . . .. It is ineffective against a flaming
lithium metal battery."3 8 There is no secure method available to
ship lithium metal batteries.3 9 Were a fire involving lithium
metal batteries to break out mid-flight, there would be no read-
ily available means to stop it, and passengers could suffer griev-
ous harm as a result.
2. Loose Batteries in Unattended Luggage
More limitations on lithium batteries were promulgated after
additional accidents occurred during air transport. Loose lith-
ium batteries were banned from checked luggage on passenger
flights, and certain exemptions from shipping regulations for
small and medium batteries were removed.4 0 The spread of reg-
ulatory restrictions to previously exempted categories illustrated
that the risk of an accident exceeded the benefit of limitless
transport. The 2007 rule eliminated exemptions for medium-
size lithium batteries being shipped via aircraft and required all
small lithium batteries to be tested in accordance with the U.N.
Manual of Tests and Criteria.4 1 Additionally, the rule specified
means by which spare batteries must be protected to prevent
short circuiting with other metal objects; the rule also limited
transport of loose spare batteries to carry-on luggage only.4 2 The
logic behind these rulings is that loose batteries may encounter
metal items, such as coins or jewelry, when stored in a bag and




37 Id. at 75,210.
38 FAA, 2012 FAA FiRE SAFETY HIGHLIGHTS 2 (2012), available at http://www.
fire.tc.faa.gov/pdf/2012Highlights.pdf.
3 See id.
40 Hazardous Materials; Transportation of Lithium Batteries, 72 Fed. Reg.
44,930 (Aug. 9, 2007) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 171-73, 175).
41 Id. at 44,935-37.
42 Id. at 44,950.
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ately detect and extinguish a fire."3 The fear of undetected lith-
ium battery fires was a principal motivator in expanding the
regulatory reach to previously exempted categories. Even after
the 2007 ban on loose batteries in luggage, the hazard- re-
mained. Between 2007 and 2009, the FAA recorded several
dozen instances of lithium batteries smoking, igniting, generat-
ing extreme heat, or exploding during air travel. 44 There may
have been even more accounts that were not reported.
II. PROBLEM
The reason behind the escalating restrictions on shipping lith-
ium batteries lies in the danger of fires igniting during flight,
which holds the potential for catastrophic consequences. While
flying is far safer than driving," with the number of accidents
per hours flown declining overall since the late 1990s,4 6 air
transport is also more regulated. Safety regulations are an im-
portant tool in reducing the total number of aviation accidents
and the resulting loss of life and property.
A. FIRE RiSK
Lithium batteries are highly reactive and flammable, generat-
ing a significant safety risk if batteries short circuit and ignite on
flights. Lithium battery fires can exceed 1,100 degrees Fahren-
heit, which is "very close to the melting point of aircraft alumi-
num."4 7 Such a fire would devastate an aircraft if flames erupted
during flight. Spontaneous ignition and thermal runaway may
not seem to pose a threat with the limited oxygen available in
some compartments, but high temperatures may cause in-flight
4 Id. at 44,937.
44 FAA, BATTERIES & BATTERY-POWERED DEVICES: AVIATION INCIDENTS INVOLV-
ING SMOKE, FIRE, EXTREME HEAT OR EXPLOSION 5-10 (2013), available at http://
www.faa.gov/about/office-org/headquarters-offices/ash/ash_programs/
hazmat/aircarrier info/media/Battery incident_chart.pdf.
4 Aurelio Locsin, Is Air Travel Safer Than Car Travel?, USA TODAY, http://
traveltips.usatoday.com/air-travel-safer-car-travel-158 1 .html (last visited Nov. 10,
2013).
46 See Aviation Statistical Reports: Accidents and Accident Rates by NTSB Classifica-
tion, 1992 through 2011, NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., http://www.ntsb.gov/data/
table2_2012.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2013).
4 HARRY WEBSTER, FAA, DOT/FAA/AR-10/31, FIRE PROTECTION FOR THE SHIP-




oxygen generators to self-activate 8 and feed a growing fire, caus-
ing greater damage.
Factors that increase the risk of lithium batteries short circuit-
ing and starting fires are things as common as dropping a mo-
bile phone on the ground. 9 Many people are unaware of the
danger posed by packing extra batteries in luggage alongside
metal coins or buying cheap, counterfeit batteries for their elec-
tronics." Used and damaged batteries are not the only lithium
batteries that present problems. Even major manufacturers have
had to enact multi-million dollar recalls because of the chance
of fire from defective lithium batteries." While defective batter-
ies are prohibited from shipment, it may be prohibitively diffi-
cult to identify which batteries are defective amidst the many
acceptable ones that pass through security systems.
B. FAA FLAMMABILITY REPORT
In 2010, the FAA conducted a study on the fire risks posed by
lithium batteries in flight, hoping to fill gaps in the existing re-
search and examine the safety of current standards. Under the
existing ICAO recommendations, small quantities of lithium
metal batteries were permitted to be shipped on passenger air-
craft if packed in regulation metal containers." However, the
FAA's tests revealed that metal containers could not contain the
flames, and molten lithium was expelled from a fire involving
only six cells." The report issued recommendations for im-
48 See DAVID BLAKE, FAA, DOT/FAA/AR-TN03/35, THE RESPONSE OF AIRCRAFT
OXYGEN GENERATORS EXPOSED TO ELEVATED TEMPERATURES 516 (2003), available
at http://www.tc.faa.gov/its/worldpac/techrpt/artnO3-35.pdf.
49 See Shipping Batteries or Devices with Batteries, UPS, http://www.ups.com/con-
tent/bb/en/resources/ship/packaging/guidelines/batteries.html (last visited
Nov. 12, 2013).
50 See, e.g., Did You Know that Counterfeit Accessories Could Melt and Burn?, CANON,
http://www.usa.canon.com/cusa/office/products/hardware/multifunction
printers-copiers/imageRUNNERADVANCESeriesModelspageKeyCode=
prdAdvDetail&docId=0901e0248004cc7e (last visited Nov. 15, 2013).
5' See Susan Arendt, Sony Battery Recall Costs $429 Million, PC MAG. (Oct. 26,
2006, 1:53 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2040937,00.asp; Mark
Hachman, Update: Sony To Ask Notebook Battery Customers for Global Recall, PC MAG.
(Sept. 29, 2006, 6:05 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2022275,00.
asp ("[T]he Sony batteries have failed spectacularly, causing high-profile fires at
conferences and aboard a plane at the Los Angeles International Airport.").
52 WEBSTER, supra note 47, at vii-viii.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 11, 14 ("The catastrophic failure of the 5-gallon pail with only six CR2
cells ended this test series.").
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proved performance standards for packing materials and found
that the materials used to pack oxygen generators sufficiently
insulated lithium fires from spreading.55 The study also con-
firmed that (1) lithium batteries may self-ignite due to physical
damage; (2) fires may spread from one battery to entire ship-
ments due to thermal runaway; (3) the heat and pressure of a
battery fire may spray flammable electrolytes; and (4) in-flight
fire retardants cannot stop the spread of thermal runaway within
shipments. 56 Situations involving battery fires that are able to be
contained and extinguished may "still lead to panic, emergency
landings, and breathing complaints related to smoke and extin-
guishing agents."5
C. REPORTS OF FiREs ON PLANES
The prevalence of lithium batteries in multiple facets of air
travel has led to increased concern; the batteries are carried by
passengers in carry-on items, stowed away, shipped en mass by
manufacturers, and used to power equipment on the aircraft.
Incidents involving fire have been reported in each category of
lithium battery transport and have gained national attention;
these incidents include the January 2013 fires on two Boeing
787 airplanes.
While uncommon, there are numerous reports of lithium bat-
tery fires on commercial aircraft; some fires have resulted in fa-
tal crashes. Since 1991, 135 incidents involving smoke, fire,
extreme heat, or explosion from batteries on aircraft regulated
by the FAA have been reported.59 This number is small in rela-
55 Id. at 16.
56 Id. at 2.
57 Bill Wilkening, FAA Office of Sec. and Hazardous Materials, Presentation at
the International Cabin Safety Conference: Battery Fires in Air Transportation
(Oct. 2007), available at http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/2007conference/files/Cabin
andHiddenAreaProtection/WedPM/WilkeningLithiumBatteries/Wilkening
LithiumBatteryPres.pdf (emphasis in original); see also Airboyd, Extinguishing In-
Flight Laptop Computer Fires-Lithium Battery Thermal Runaway, YouTUBE (Jan. 26,
2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vS6KASi-m8 (crediting the FAA as
the video creator).
58 Press Release, Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., NTSB Chairman Says "We Have Not
Ruled Anything Out" in Investigation of Boeing 787 Battery Fire in Boston (Jan.
24, 2013), available at http://www.ntsb.gov/news/2013/130124.html ("'One of
these events alone is serious; two of them in close proximity, especially in an
airplane model with only about 100,000 flight hours, underscores the importance
of getting to the root cause of these incidents."' (quoting NTSB Chairman
Deborah A.P. Hersman)).
59 FAA, BATTERIES & BATTERY-POWERED DEVICES, supra note 44, at 6.
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tion to the total number of flights that have taken place during
the past two decades, but some incidents are never reported be-
cause lithium batteries are not currently fully regulated as haz-
ardous materials and thus are not subject to mandatory
reporting requirements."o Of the reported accidents where bat-
teries were involved, the damage varied from smoking boxes to
downed cargo flights.6 1 An early case in Los Angeles involved
two pallets of 120,000 mishandled lithium metal batteries ignit-
ing after being unloaded from a passenger flight arriving from
Japan.6 2 Attempts to extinguish the fire with water and chemical
flame retardants failed." In 2004, prototype lithium batteries
being shipped from California to Paris ignited after they were
loaded onto a Federal Express (FedEx) cargo flight in Memphis,
destroying and damaging many other packages. 64 The large
shipment of lithium batteries aboard a United Parcel Service
(UPS) cargo flight is suspected of causing the plane's crash into
a Dubai military base in 2010.65 Both crewmembers were killed,
but collateral damage was limited due to the uninhabited crash
site.66
After the Dubai crash, the FAA investigated the threat to
cargo planes caused by onboard fires. The research anticipated
another 4.5 battery fire incidents between 2011 and 2020.6" The
projected annual cost for these incidents is $39.5 million, which
includes the cost of damaged or destroyed aircraft, lost lives, and
collateral damage." The study included only cargo aircraft-it
did not include passenger aircraft, which would have a higher
cost due to the greater number of passengers traveling on the
plane. 9
6o See Letter from Cynthia Douglass, Acting Deputy Adm'r, Pipeline & Hazard-
ous Materials Safety Admin., to Deborah A.P. Hersman, Chairman, NTSB (Oct.
13, 2010), available at http://phmsa.dot.gov/staticfiles/PHMSA/Downloadable
Files/Hazmat/NTSB A 07_104_108 NTSB.pdf.
61 See FAA, BATTERIES & BATTERY-POWERED DEVICES, supra note 44, at 6.
62 Id. at 20.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 16.
65 FAA, DOT/FAA/AR-11/18, FREIGHTER AIRPLANE CARGO FIRE RISK MODEL 1
(2011), available at http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/pdf/11-18.pdf.
66 Id. at 3.
67 Id. at 11.
6 Id. at 24.
69 See id. at 22-24.
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D. 2010 PROPOSED RULE
In an effort to protect the public and the aviation community,
the DOT sought to subject all lithium batteries to additional
safety and labeling regulations in 2010.70 The responsible
agency, the PHMSA, proposed a new rule that classified even
small lithium batteries as "Class 9" hazardous materials subject
to safety and labeling regulations.7 1 The rule would have also
required uniform labeling of packages containing the batteries
and notification to pilots of the shipments along with their loca-
tion aboard the plane.7 2 Legislators in favor of the rule noted
the illogical standard of regulating less dangerous items but
leaving lithium batteries, which have a record of spontaneous
thermal runaway, unregulated.73 Additionally, recommenda-
tions for the proposed rule called for the mandatory reporting
of incidents involving lithium batteries on passenger and cargo
planes as well as a public education campaign about the proper
transport of batteries. 74 The changes included in the proposed
rule fell short of the proposed ban on bulk shipments of lithium
batteries on passenger and cargo planes sought by the world's
largest pilots' union in 2009.11 An organization representing
electronics manufacturers vehemently opposed the proposed
rule, asserting that the cost of compliance would be over $1 bil-
lion annually, compared to the $9.4 million per year estimated
by the PHMSA. 6 However, electronics manufacturers may have
had an incentive to overstate the costs of regulation in order to
70 See Hazardous Materials: Transportation of Lithium Batteries, 75 Fed. Reg.
1302, 1310 (proposed Jan. 11, 2010) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 172-73,
175).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 1311.
73 Press Release, Patricia Klinger &Joe Delcambre, U.S. Dep't of Transp., DOT
Issues Additional Proposed Rule on Transportation of Lithium Batteries 2 (Jan.
8, 2010), available at http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/staticfiles/PHMSA/Download-
ableFiles/LithiumBatteryNPRMPressReleasel_8_10.pdf ("'Under existing regu-
lations, a flight crew may not be made aware of a pallet containing thousands of
lithium batteries on board the aircraft, yet a five-pound package of flammable
paint or dry ice would be subject to the full scope of the regulations."' (quoting
Representative Jim Oberstar (D-MN))).
74 Letter from Cynthia Douglass, supra note 60.
75 Assoc. Press, Union: Ban Lithium Batteries on Planes, CBSNEWS.COM (Aug. 25,
2009, 4:34 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-205_162-5264726.html.
76 See RECHARGEABLE BATTERY Ass'N, THE PROPOSED RULE CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED





maintain the profit margins currently earned through loose re-
strictions on lithium battery shipments. Additionally, the elec-
tronics manufacturers threatened that jobs at U.S. shipping
distribution centers would be relocated to Canada or Mexico if
lithium batteries were to be considered hazardous materials."
The industry groups claimed that the proposed regulations had
not provided historical evidence of injuries or deaths from lith-
ium battery fires; they also claimed that there was no proof any
aircraft would be lost in the next ten years if the current ship-
ping standards were to remain in place.78 Their cost estimates
likely failed to include the true financial losses stemming from
damaged cargo or downed planes that battery fires could
cause.7 1 Instead of more stringent regulations, groups asserted
that better enforcement of current regulations was needed; in-
other words, they blamed incidents on noncompliance rather
than inadequate safety measures.80
E. THE FAA MODERNIZATION AND REFORm ACT OF 2012
1. Amendments and Lobbying
Meanwhile, the FAA's spending authorization had lapsed in
2007 and was continued through a series of short-term exten-
sions until Congress reauthorized the agency."' The House's
proposed FAA reauthorization bill-formally, the FAA Moderni-
zation and Reform Act of 2012-resulted in two amendments
related to lithium batteries: Representative Bob Filner (D-CA)
proposed to prohibit lithium metal batteries aboard all aircraft,
including cargo flights, until packaging and fire suppression sys-
tems were available to extinguish a fire caused by the batteries;82
Representative John Mica (R-FL) introduced an amendment
that prohibited the DOT from regulating lithium batteries any
more stringently than international standards.8 1 Pilots' unions
77 Id.
78 See Levin, Battery-Fire Crashes Seen Every Other Year as U.S. Rules Fought, supra
note 25.
79 See RECHARGEABLE BATTERY Ass'N, THE PROPOSED RULE CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED
By PHMSA's CosT-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, supra note 76, at i-ii.
80 Linda Werfelman, Battery Rules, AEROSAFETY WORLD, Mar. 2010, at 45-46.
81 See BART ELIAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., R41798, FAA REAUTHORIZATION: AN
OVERVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE ACTION IN THE 112TH CONGRESS 1 (2011).
82 REP. ROBERT FILNER, H. COMM. ON RULES, 112TH CONG., AMENDMENT TO THE
RULES COMM. PRINT OF H.R. 658 (Comm. Print 2011).
88 Pete Kasperowicz, Lithium Battery Air Transport a Point of Contention in FAA
Debate, HILL (Mar. 31, 2011, 5:19 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/
house/1 53181-lithium-battery-air-transport-a-point-of-contention-in-faa-debate.
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supported the Filner amendment," while electronics, manufac-
turing, airline, and shipping groups supported the Mica amend-
ment.8 5 In the end, Filner's amendment was defeated and
Mica's remained, as battery issues were overshadowed by the de-
bate over anti-union language within the bill. 6
Representative Mica, who is also the Chairman of the House
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, had a strong
incentive to craft the battery regulation prohibition into the
FAA Modernization and Reform Act.8 7 Groups that oppose lith-
ium battery regulations, such as electronics manufacturing com-
panies, airlines, and private shipping companies, contributed
generously to Representative Mica in the years leading up to the
Act's passage." Although pilots' unions contributed money to
Representative Mica as well, union groups' donations were vastly
exceeded by industry groups who opposed the PHMSA's 2010
proposed rule." In the end, the lobbying efforts of industry
groups triumphed over unions and the passed version of the bill
contained a provision that prohibited the Secretary of Transpor-
tation from enacting more stringent standards than those used
internationally. 90
2. Section 828-Prohibition on Regulation
Representative Mica's anti-regulation amendment became
Section 828 in the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012.
Section 828 applies a ceiling for safety limits on shipments of
84 Press Release, Coal. of Airline Pilots Ass'ns, CAPA Supports Rep. Filner's
"Lithium Battery" Amendment to the FAA Reauthorization Bill (Mar. 30, 2011),
available at http://www.capapilots.org/capa-supports-rep-filners-amendment-18-
on-lithium-batteries-to-the-faa-reauth-bill.
85 Press Release, Airlines for Am., Coalition Letter in Support of the Interna-
tional Harmonization of Lithium Battery Rules (Mar. 30, 2011), available at http:/
/www.airlines.org/Pages/Coalition-Letter-in-Support-of-the-International-Har-
monization-of-Lithium-Battery-Rules.aspx; Press Release, Nat'l Elec. Mfr. Ass'n,
NEMA Welcomes House Approval of Legislation to Harmonize Lithium Battery
Transportation Safety Standards (Apr. 1, 2011), available at http://www.nema.
org/News/Pages/NEMA-Welcomes-House-Approval-of-Legislation-to-Harmo-
nize-Lithium-Battery-Transportation-Safety-Standards.aspx.
86 SeeJohn Logan, Why Obama Should Have Vetoed FAA Reauthorization Act, HIuL
(Feb. 17, 2012, 3:54 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/labor/2114
71-why-obama-should-have-vetoed-faa-reauthorization-act.
87 Id.
88 Contributions Received by Mica for Congress, FED. ELECTION COMM'N, http://
query.nictusa.com/cgi-bin/com-rcvd/C00283051/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2013).
89 See id.
90 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 828, 126
Stat. 11, 133-34 (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44701).
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lithium batteries with a clause that allows stricter regulations if
the Secretary of Transportation is given a "credible report" of
their danger." The language is unclear as to what would qualify
as a "credible report." Such a report would authorize an emer-
gency regulation for no more than a year and would only ad-
dress the deficiency found in the report.9 2 A permanent
regulation that is stricter than international standards can only
be enacted if it is the least disruptive and expensive variation
from the original regulation." Supporters of the prohibition on
additional safety regulations cited a fear that additional rules
would hurt national businesses, delay electronics from reaching
consumers, or prevent the country from obtaining the efficiency
of having uniform international standards.9 4 Representative
Mica took the industries' cost assessments at face value, dis-
missing the PHMSA's cost and risk assessments without consid-
eration and referring to the proposed regulations as "silly."9 5
Meanwhile, pilots' unions were strongly opposed to the prohi-
bition on more stringent safety standards. The group felt that
national standards lacked adequate safeguards to protect pilots
flying cargo aircraft. 6 Its statement voiced concern: "'The FAA's
own model predicts the loss of 4-5 cargo aircraft over the next
ten years due to the bulk carriage of lithium batteries, and some-
how that is acceptable?'"" Section 828 appears to consider only
the financial interests of industry groups rather than give equal
weight to the research done by the DOT's agencies and the con-
cern expressed by pilots whose lives are at risk.
F. NEW ICAO RULINGS
The ICAO met in February 2012 to develop new international




94 See 157 CONG. REc. H2130 (daily ed. Mar. 31, 2011) (statement of Rep.John
Mica); Press Release, Rep. Robert E. Latta, Latta Supports Amendment to FAA
Bill Rulemaking on Lithium Batteries (Apr. 1, 2011), available at http://Iatta.
house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentlD=2334 7 8.
95 Rep. John Mica, Highlights from the House Floor, TRANSP. AND INFRASTRUCTURE
COMM., http://archives.republicans.transportation.house.gov/singlepages.aspx/
900 (last visited Nov. 10, 2013).
96 Press Release, Coal. of Airline Pilots Ass'n, CAPA Response to FAA
Reauthorization Bill (Feb. 7, 2012), available at http://www.capapilots.org/capa-
response-to-faa-reauthorization-bill.
97 Id. (quoting CAPA President Captain Carl Kuwitzky).
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to take effect on January 1, 2013." The new regulations ex-
panded the number of lithium batteries subject to safety regula-
tions" but fell short of what the DOT sought to include in the
2010 proposed rule. The PHMSA proposed that the United
States adopt the international standards in April 2012,100 and
most groups in the airline and manufacturing industries sup-
ported the change.101 However, the limitations set in the FAA
Modernization and Reform Act appear to have made the
PHMSA hesitant to even rise to the level of regulation allowed
by Congress. The PHMSA issued another notice inJanuary 2013
suggesting that shippers and carriers should be able to choose
between the international standards for shipping lithium batter-
ies and the weaker national standards still in place. 0 2 The ratio-
nale behind prohibiting the stricter 2010 rule was to harmonize
the country's regulations with international standards, yet the
new development allowing U.S. cargo airlines to be exempt
from international restrictions seems to be in direct conflict with
a streamlined and safer policy. The establishment of two differ-
ent shipping standards for lithium batteries diverges from the
harmonization with international standards sought by the ma-
jority of interested parties. Allowing the choice between weaker
national standards and stronger international standards could
pose a significant hurdle in enforcing compliance with shipping
regulations and present a challenge for carriers that handle
thousands of packages containing lithium batteries on a daily
basis. 03
III. REFORM
The DOT's mission is to "[s]erve the United States by ensur-
ing a fast, safe, efficient, accessible and convenient transporta-
tion system that meets our vital national interests and enhances
the quality of life of the American people, today and into the
98 See Working Grp. of the Whole on Lithium Batteries, supra note 27.
99 See id. at 5.
100 Hazardous Materials: Transportation of Lithium Batteries, 77 Fed. Reg.
21,714 (Apr. 11, 2012) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 172-73, 175).
101 Alan Levin, Opt-Out Possibility on Airline Battery-Fire Rule Offered, BLOOMBERG
(Jan. 4, 2013, 3:17 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201 3-01-04/opt-out-
possibility-on-airline-battery-fire-rule-offered.html.
102 Hazardous Materials: Transportation of Lithium Batteries, 78 Fed. Reg.
1119 (Jan. 7, 2013) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 172-173, and 175).
103 George A. Kerchner, DOT Publishes Third Lithium Battery Proposal; Complete




future."10 4 Agencies regulating aviation matters within the DOT,
including the FAA and the PHMSA, specifically work to ensure
the safety of air transportation by regulating hazardous materi-
als." Section 828 conflicts with those goals by setting a cap on
the actions the DOT can take to ensure the safety of workers
and travelers in the airline industry. In setting a ceiling for safety
rather than a floor, Section 828 unnecessarily limits the auton-
omy of the DOT to protect people from a known risk. Further-
more, since the insertion of the provision in the FAA
Modernization and Reform Act, the PHMSA has reconsidered
even promulgating allowable regulations, generating greater
levels of uncertainty and discord in shipping standards for lith-
ium batteries.1 0 6
A. PRIORITIZE SAFETY IN REGULATIONS
Section 828 effectively prohibits the DOT from regulating avi-
ation safety to the degree it deems necessary. The DOT's agen-
cies recognized the risk of lithium batteries in air transport after
numerous incidents, studied the problem extensively, issued a
report of findings, and attempted to regulate the hazard as
needed to minimize the risk of aviation fires and crashes.107 Af-
firmative protection of aviation safety plays a pivotal role in
preventing future crashes by restructuring regulations before cat-
astrophic incidents occur. The DOT should be in charge of de-
termining what safety regulations are necessary for U.S.
airplanes and the shipment of hazardous materials; the agency's
power should not be constrained by lobbyists from external in-
dustries. While the electronics industry may have to deal with
additional costs of compliance due to enhanced shipping regu-
lations for lithium batteries, the costs resulting from accidents
104 About Us: Mission, DEP'T OF TRANsP., http://www.dot.gov/mission/about-us
(last updated Sept. 11, 2012).
105 Mission, FAA, http://www.faa.gov/about/mission/ (last modified Apr. 23,
2010) ("Our continuing mission is to provide the safest, most efficient aerospace
system in the world."); Mission & Goals, PIPELINE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY
ADMIN., http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/about/mission (last visited Nov. 10, 2013)
("[PHMSA's] mission is to protect people and the environment from the risks of
hazardous materials transportation.").
106 Letter from Cynthia Quarterman, Adm'r, Pipeline & Hazardous Material
Safety Admin., to Deborah A.P. Hersman, Chairman, Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd.
(June 6, 2012), available at http://phmsa.dot.gov/staticfiles/PHMSA/Download-
ableFiles/Files/Hazmat/Regulations/PHMSA%20response%20to%20A-07-104
%20to%20109.pdf.
107 See supra Part II.B.
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involving battery fires on flights may be far greater'0 8 due to the
potential for lost lives and property damage in a fire ignited and
fueled by lithium batteries. The cost of stronger regulations may
be reduced over time as accidents are averted and costs of com-
pliance decrease with greater efficiency.
The move to synchronize U.S. standards with those of the in-
ternational community stands to increase efficiency and ensure
that the country achieves at least a minimum standard of safety.
However, the proposed choice between weaker-than-interna-
tional standards or compliance with international rules fails to
set a high enough threshold for safety due to the continued ex-
emption of many shipments of lithium batteries. Rather than set
a ceiling on safety, regulations should strive to set a floor that
maximizes the benefit while minimizing harm. It is fully consis-
tent for countries to exceed international standards in their reg-
ulations. For example, the European Union (EU) set its own
rigorous standard for aviation emissions after the ICAO failed to
set limits the EU deemed appropriate."o' International regula-
tory groups with large member bodies may move slowly and may
not aim as high as individual member states would prefer.
If the DOT deems it necessary to regulate more strictly for the
safety of the public, its hands should not be tied. The 2010 pro-
posed lithium battery rule was not created from baseless assump-
tions; rather, it was promulgated after extensive research on the
risks that lithium batteries pose and what changes would be
needed to ensure the safety of passengers and workers in the
airline industry. The many reports of battery fires and the fail-
ure of current standards to minimize the risk of fire during
flight elucidate why the current standards are inadequate.
The basis behind having more stringent safety regulations for
shipping hazardous materials on airplanes, as opposed to on-
the-ground transport, is rooted in the greater risk and magni-
tude of damage that may be caused by an aviation accident. For
example, the 1995 crash of ValueJet 592 in the Everglades re-
sulted in the death of all 110 passengers and crew on board and
108 See Hiroko Tabuchi, Japan Airlines Says 787 Grounding Will Cost It $7.5 Mil-
lion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2013, at B4 (establishing six-figure costs for the tempo-
rary grounding of seven planes due to lithium battery issues).
19 See Reducing Emissions from the Aviation Sector, EUR. COMM'N, http://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/clima/policies/transport/aviation/index-en.htm (last updated July 1,
2013) ("The EU has been seeking a global agreement to tackle aviation emissions
through the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) for more than 15
years.").
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illustrated how the DOT's worry regarding safety risk could re-
sult in disastrous consequences if the risk continues un-
checked. 10 The resulting investigation of the Valuejet crash
reinvigorated the FAA's safety purpose and managed to create
change from the tragedy."' However, the loss of life in this cir-
cumstance could have been prevented had safety been regu-
lated adequately prior to the incident. It appeared that the 2010
UPS crash in Dubai'1 2 was going to serve as a similar catalyst to
action. The Dubai crash claimed the lives of two pilots, in con-
trast to the triple-digit fatalities stemming from the loss of the
Valuejet passenger plane."1 ' Both Valuejet and UPS crashes
avoided civilian fatalities on the ground by mere happenstance:
Valuejet crashed in the Everglades National Park and UPS
crashed in an empty portion of a military base."' Going for-
ward, the risk associated with weak regulation of lithium battery
air transport is that plane crashes are unpredictable and may
have catastrophic consequences if they occur in densely popu-
lated areas.
A stricter standard for air transport of lithium batteries would
prevent major accidents and future loss of life and property.
The DOT should be able to proactively set rules that prevent
unexpected delays and plane groundings by being permitted to
regulate hazardous items in a way that minimizes risk. Yet when
the DOT's agencies take steps to prevent future harm, not only
are the proposed rules fought, but more stringent prohibitions
are also placed on the agencies, limiting their ability to enhance
safety. The proposition that shippers should choose between
stronger international standards and weaker national standards
is a step in the opposite direction from which regulators should
be heading. The legal impediment to increased regulations
takes explicit form in Section 828 and is the consequence of
wealthy and well-organized groups advocating their own inter-
ests above the public's safety.
110 See William Langewiesche, The Lessons of Valujet 592, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1,
1998, 12:00 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1998/03/the-
lessons-of-valujet-592/306534/.
In Id.
112 See FAA, FREIGHTER AIRPLANE CARGO FIRE RISK MODEL, supra note 65, at 1.
u1 See Stephen Pope, UPS 747 Crash Highlights Lithium Battery Danger, FLYING
MAG. (July 25, 2013), http://www.flyingmag.com/news/ups-747-crash-highlights-
lithium-battery-danger.
114 See id.; Langewiesche, supra note 110.
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B. ADDITIONAL SAFETY PROVISIONS
Greater awareness of the presence of lithium batteries on air-
craft, comprehensive accident reporting requirements, and
more secure packing materials will result in reduced risk for lith-
ium battery transport on planes. Several of these suggestions
overlap with the 2010 proposed rule cited by industry groups as
being too costly. However, estimates by industry groups regard-
ing the potential cost of regulation may be exaggerated."' It
seems unwise to allow industries that are not held liable for the
damage resulting from aircraft accidents to dictate safety policy
in the aviation industry without taking calculations performed
by government agencies into account.
One of the main elements sought by pilots' unions is a notifi-
cation requirement for when lithium batteries are on board. "Pi-
lot [n]otification would increase awareness of the shipments
and improve any necessary emergency response.""' While re-
quiring notifications for smaller quantities of lithium battery
shipments would increase the number of notifications a pilot
receives, it would also provide the information needed for pilots
to appropriately respond to the dangers posed by the presence
of spontaneously ignitable materials and the risk of thermal run-
away in shipments of multiple batteries. Such information is
standard under 49 C.F.R. § 175.33, which requires that pilots be
notified when Class 9 hazardous materials are on board with the
name of the material, number of packages, net quantity or gross
weight, location of packages aboard the aircraft, confirmation
that packages are neither damaged nor leaking, and the date of
flight.'17 The current notification requirement applies to materi-
als that are reasonably benign, such as dry ice, yet exempts ship-
ments of lithium batteries." While pilots of passenger planes
may be aware of the presence of individual batteries in laptops,
cell phones, and other electronics on board, informing them
about shipments of multiple batteries, particularly in the cargo
115 SeeJohn D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics,
157 U. PA. L. REv. 395, 511 (2008) ("If companies are making a one-time esti-
mate of cost to a regulator, the incentive to exaggerate may be pronounced.").
116 ICAO, IFALPA's Position Regarding Lithium Metal and Lithium Ion Batteries, at
2.3, ICAO Doc. DGP/21-IP/2 (Nov. 1, 2007), available at http://www.icao.int/
safety/DangerousGoods/DGP%2021%20Working%2OPapers/DGP.21.IP.002.5.
en.pdf.
117 See Hazardous Materials: Transportation of Lithium Batteries, 75 Fed. Reg.
1302 (proposed Jan. 11, 2010) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 172-173, 175).
118 49 C.F.R. § 175.33 (2012).
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area, enables them to make educated decisions if an emergency
were to arise.
An additional hurdle to ensuring the safe air transport of lith-
ium batteries is the lack of a mandatory reporting requirement
for when fires and accidents occur. This may result in an under-
estimation of the actual number of battery-related incidents.
Mandatory reporting requirements for any incidence of smok-
ing or fire coming from a lithium battery being shipped on a
flight could provide a more accurate assessment of the total
number of incidents and aid in properly accounting for future
risk. As demonstrated by past incidents, not all fires occur dur-
ing flight."' Some fires have ignited during loading because
packages are handled improperly or without adequate care, and
others have started after arrival.12 0 A comprehensive policy re-
quiring reporting of lithium battery incidents throughout the
entire shipment cycle would help determine at which point fires
are most likely to break out and further clarify which batteries
and types of shipments pose the greatest danger so that they can
be watched with increased stringency in the future.
Additionally, the metal shipping containers previously used
for shipment of lithium batteries have failed to adequately con-
tain the spread of fire once batteries have ignited. More secure
shipping materials should be required. The same packaging
used to contain hazardous materials like oxygen generators has
been successful at containing lithium battery fires, illustrating
that effective technology already exists to promote greater
safety. 1 21 It makes sense to require packaging that prevents ther-
mal runaway in all shipments involving multiple lithium batter-
ies because there is a high risk of the fire spreading from one
cell to another; furthermore, the heat of such a fire could have
negative consequences for the plane's other cargo. The FAA re-
cently completed more research on packing materials that effec-
tively prevent the spread of fire once a lithium battery ignites
during shipment. 1 22 The study confirmed that batteries' ten-
119 See FAA, BATTERIES & BATTERY-POWERED DEVICES, supra note 44.
120 See supra Part II.C.
121 WEBSTER, supra note 47, at 16 ("The oxygen generator overpack perform-
ance standards can be used as a basis for a performance standard for lithium-ion
cells.").
122 Thomas Maloney, FAA Fire Safety, Presentation at Systems Meeting: Passive
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dency to propagate is highly dependent on the cell's state-of-
charge.12 3 While the ordinary cardboard cell separators cur-
rently used in packaging fail to stop the ignition of nearby lith-
ium cells, both aramid and acrylic separators delay the cells'
propagation time.12 4 Additionally, placing water packs on top of
the cells effectively absorbs the energy from ignition and pre-
vents further propagation.12 1 Without Section 828 in place, the
DOT would be more nimble and could establish new regula-
tions based on innovative research that prevents the spread of
fire from lithium batteries, resulting in safer shipments.
IV. CONCLUSION
As portable electronics and lithium batteries continue to per-
meate modern life and travel, stringent safety regulations are
needed to reduce the risk of fire during flight. Section 828
works to restrict the ability of agencies charged with protecting
the public from regulating in a manner that would further their
safety goals. Rather than allow wealthy private interests to deter-
mine what safety measures are necessary, Congress should leave
that power in the hands to which it was delegated, furthering
the common good rather than an industry's agendas.
123 Id. at 12.
124 Id. at 9.
125 Id. at 10.
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